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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE

Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner

†

February 7, 2017

Abstract. The two most vilified cases in administrative law are Business
Roundtable v. SEC and Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA. In Business
Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC’s proxy access rule
because the agency’s cost-benefit analysis of the regulation, in the court’s
view, was defective. In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit struck
down an EPA regulation of asbestos products on the same grounds. Nearly
all scholars who have written about these cases have condemned them. We
argue that the courts acted properly. The regulators’ cost-benefit analyses
were defective, seriously so; and the courts were right to require the
agencies to show that their regulations passed an adequate cost-benefit
analysis. We further argue that the trajectory of law and policy is consistent
with our view. Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable are
harbingers rather than errors—harbingers of an era of enhanced judicial
review of CBA.

INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario. A pro-regulatory president serves
two terms, during which his administration issues a significant number of
regulations. Most of these regulations are cost-benefit justified, in the sense
that they produce greater benefits to well-being than costs. 1 Then, after
†
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1
During the eight years of the Obama Administration, the regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies produced benefits in excess of costs. Shaun Donovan, Exit Memo:
Office of Management and Budget, The White House Archives (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/cabinet/exit-memos/officemanagement-and-budget; see also Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified
Benefits and the Problem of Regulation under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87

eight years, a new anti-regulatory president 2 assumes office and vows to
dismantle many of his predecessor’s regulations, beginning with regulation
meant to curb the emission of greenhouse gases. 3 A president who wishes to
deregulate must promulgate a new regulation that repeals the existing one,
just as Congress must pass a new statute to repeal an existing statute. So the
president issues a regulation canceling the greenhouse gas rule. But this
new deregulatory regulation is not cost-benefit justified. It repeals an earlier
regulation that produced more benefits than costs, and thus itself generates
costs in excess of benefits. 4 If the new regulation is challenged, how should
a court respond? Should it permit a regulation—here, a regulation that
dismantles earlier regulations—that would do more harm than good?
This scenario is of course not hypothetical. But the problem is
general and spans the entirety of the regulatory state. When courts are asked
to review regulations issued by government agencies, how closely should
they scrutinize the agency’s reasons for regulating? At one extreme, courts
could examine the regulations de novo, in effect delegating to the agency
the task of collecting evidence and providing an initial assessment, but then
replacing the agency’s judgment with their own. Call this level of review
“high.” At the other extreme, courts could rubberstamp any regulation as
long as the agency provides reasons for it that are prima facie plausible, or
even no reasons at all—call this level of review “low.” High and low are
ends of a spectrum: one could endorse any intermediate level as well. The
courts have struggled to articulate the proper level, leading scholars to
suspect that they do not review regulations in a consistent way. 5 Scholars
themselves offer a multitude of interpretations, often unhelpful restatements
(2016) (finding that most regulations produced benefits in excess of costs, even when they
failed to fully quantify those benefits).
2
Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,
January 30, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/presidentialexecutive-order-reducing-regulation-and-controlling (ordering that two regulations be
repealed for every new regulation that is promulgated).
3
Kyle Feldscher, Trump Would Repeal Clean Power Plan, Other Big EPA Regs, WASH.
EXAMINER, September 15, 2016, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-wouldrepeal-clean-power-plan-other-big-epa-regs/article/2601931.
4
See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule (2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf
(analyzing the Clean Power Plan and finding that it produces significantly greater benefits
than costs).
5
See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 360 (2012)
(stating that when interpreting regulations “[c]ourts not only lack a consistent approach, but
also generally invoke one interpretative tool or another without stating reasons for doing
so”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008) (providing evidence that Supreme Court justices apply the
arbitrary and capricious standard in a way that reflects their ideological biases).
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of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard in the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) using different but equally ambiguous words. 6 More than 70
years after the APA placed the question of judicial review at the center of
administrative law, no one agrees how it should operate.
Scholars do agree on one thing: that the courts went too far in two
notorious cases—Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA 7 and Business
Roundtable v. SEC. 8 The interesting thing about these cases is that they both
involved cost-benefit analysis (CBA), a decision procedure that most
agencies use to evaluate major regulations but that rarely provides the basis
for rigorous judicial scrutiny. The EPA used a CBA to justify regulations
that limited the use of asbestos products, while the SEC used a CBA to
justify a regulation that required corporations to place certain shareholder
nominees to board positions on proxy ballots. The courts struck down both
regulations because the CBAs were, in the courts’ view, defective. Almost
all scholars who have written about these cases agree that the courts acted
wrongly by requiring the agencies to justify their regulations with valid
CBAs. 9
In this Essay, we seek to refute this conventional wisdom, and also
to shed light on the controversy over levels of review. We argue that both
cases were correctly decided. The CBAs really were inadequate, and the
courts were right to strike down the regulations. Our larger point concerns
the relationship between judicial review of regulations and quantitative
methods of evaluating policy, of which CBA is the leading (but not only)
example. 10 We argue that when quantitative methods are appropriate for
evaluating regulations, a “high” level of judicial review is justified.
To understand why, we begin with the basic tradeoff involved in
judicial review of regulations, which has been repeated ad infinitum in the
literature but is accurate as far as it goes. 11 The major difference between
6

See R. George Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea in Administrative
Law Can’t be Defined, and What This Means for Law in General, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 839,
851 (2010).
7
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
8
647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
9
See infra Part II.
10
There are other quantitative methods, including reliance on subjective well-being
surveys. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being
Analysis v. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J.1603 (2013). In principle, feasibility
analysis could be quantified though it never is. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner,
Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010) (describing examples of
feasibility analysis and the lack of quantification).
11
For a lucid recent statement, see Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness
Review
(Harvard
Public
Law
Working
Paper
No.
16-12
2016),
see
also
ADRIAN
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2752068;
VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION (2016).
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judges and agency officials is that judges are generalists and agency
officials are experts. Because experts know more about their field than
generalists do, generalists should defer to the judgment of experts, all else
equal. This is the major argument for a low level of review. But all else is
not equal. Agency officials may make mistakes and, more important, they
may be biased—consciously or unconsciously—and their biases may
influence how they evaluate regulations. Their biases could be ideological,
of course; but they could also reflect other inclinations—for example, to act
rather than to remain passive under public pressure; 12 or to advance the
partisan interests of political masters such as the president or members of
Congress. 13 High-level judicial review is most clearly justified when
agencies are biased.
To be sure, bias is complicated, and judges can be biased too. 14 But
the posture of the debate is one of offering advice to the judiciary, which
assumes that the judiciary is unbiased enough to accept this advice in good
faith. (If not, claims on both sides of the argument are idle.) There is also
reason to think that the federal judiciary on the whole is less biased than
agency leaders—just because the federal judiciary is normally bipartisan
while agency leadership is rarely so, and judges cannot be fired while
agency leaders can be. That said, the relative level of bias and openmindedness as between judiciary and bureaucracy is an empirical question,
and no doubt different intuitions about the empirics help explain why
scholars disagree about the proper level of review. Nonetheless, the
expertise-neutrality tradeoff remains a useful device for exploring
arguments about judicial review, and we employ it here.
Our major claim is that quantification—reflected in CBA and other
methods—changes the terms of the debate. The unique feature of
quantification is that it facilitates review. When regulators eschew
quantification in their explanations for regulations, they typically put forth
boilerplate that is difficult to evaluate. It is tempting, for example, for a
regulator to say that a pollution regulation is justified because pollution
causes harm, and less harm is good. Such a justification can be applied to
any regulation, so if it were accepted by courts, regulators would be
immunized from review as long as they satisfy procedural requirements and
avoid making any provably false statements of fact. If regulators are biased
12

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 76-81 (2002).
Matthew Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 53 (2008) (describing how the executive branch and Congress can attempt to control
the bureaucracy); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001) (describing how the executive uses federal regulation to accomplish objectives that
are blocked by Congress).
14
For evidence, see Miles & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 782 (providing evidence that judges
decide administrative law cases at least partially in line with their political preferences).
13
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or sometimes biased, they would be free to regulate in a biased fashioned
rather than for the public good. Courts would be unable to stop them.
By contrast, quantification forces regulators to put their decisionmaking into a format that can be evaluated by generalist superiors. This
process is hardly unfamiliar: it is the way that (for example) the heads of
corporations evaluate the work of their subordinates. A CEO must contend
with the claims of the division heads who seek approval for their projects.
The CEO is a generalist; the division heads are specialists. Rather than
throw up their hands and approve any project that a division head proposes
as long as the division head gives “reasons,” CEOs demand that the reasons
take a particular quantified form. The division head must perform a net
present value (NPV) analysis, which is an estimate of the benefits and costs
of the project for the firm. As in the case of agency regulations, some
benefits and costs are easier to quantify than others. Money pouring in from
future sales can be easily quantified, but the effect of a project on the brand
and legal risk are often conjectural.
Imagine that the division head of a pharmaceutical company
proposes a drug that may produce side effects that give rise to litigation and
harm the reputation of the company as a whole. The division head will need
to use judgment to evaluate these complex risks, but in the end the risks will
be quantified and folded into an overall NPV analysis of the project that
acknowledges the uncertainty of certain estimates but relies on them
nonetheless. The value of this exercise—even when certain predictions are
not much better than guesswork—is that it isolates the risks, allowing for
careful consideration of them, and that it preserves the predictions for later
review, allowing executives to learn from past mistakes and to evaluate the
predictive abilities of their staffs. With the NPV in hand, the CEO can
approve or disapprove the project based on firm-wide considerations that
the division head may be unaware of or inclined to ignore.
Quantification occurs in many other contexts as well. Firms are
required to follow accounting rules, which help shareholders, creditors,
governments, and other interested parties to evaluate the business. The
grading of students is another form of quantification that facilitates
evaluation by hiring committees; so is the evaluation of teachers with
ratings systems. Cars, books, kitchen utensils, and other consumer goods
are given quantified ratings. Universities are ranked; borrowers are assigned
credit scores; banks are given CAMELS ratings. Quantified evaluation is
ubiquitous because quantification enables generalists—frequently superiors,
but also consumers—to evaluate the claims of specialists. Given the
ubiquity of quantified evaluation in daily life, the claim that government
regulations and projects cannot be subject to similar forms of quantified
evaluation is bizarre.

5

Courts should ensure that regulatory agencies perform the quantified
evaluation of their regulations adequately, just as they do when they
evaluate the accounting statements of businesses accused of fraud and
citizens accused of failing to pay taxes. But what does “adequate” mean?
This is a tricky question, and we suspect there is no general answer to it.
Courts should insist that regulators quantify benefits and costs, but courts
should also take seriously arguments that certain estimates require judgment
calls that the regulator is in the better position to make than a court is. In
some cases, the regulator must reconcile conflicting academic studies, and a
court may properly conclude that the regulator’s judgment is reasonable
even if the court does not share it. In other cases, quantification may be
impossible or pointless, as we discuss below. But the key thing to
understand is that at the current moment in the development of the
regulatory state, cost-benefit analyses tend to be low quality rather than
high quality, suggesting that greater judicial involvement will cause more
good than harm. 15 At some future time, this may no longer be true, but we
are a long way from that happy condition.
Critics of judicial CBA mandates of the sort introduced in Corrosion
Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable argue that courts are not qualified
to evaluate the expert determinations of agencies. 16 They draw on an old
distinction between procedure and substance. Courts are capable of forcing
regulators to comply with procedural rules—notice requirements, for
example. But they are in a weak position to second-guess substantive
determinations like valuations. However, CBA is foremost a decision
procedure. 17 If courts can review agencies for procedural violations, then it
can review agencies for their compliance with the rules of CBA. The genius
of CBA, in common with other quantitative decision procedures, is that it
cabins the decision-maker’s discretion by forcing it to comply with certain
rules. The courts in Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable
correctly pointed out that the regulators violated the rules of CBA. There
does remain a residuum of substantive discretion that the rules of CBA do
not eliminate. With respect to these substantive judgments, courts do need
tread carefully, for all the conventional reasons, which we discuss below.
We start in Part I with a brief reprisal of the normative case for CBA
and then argue that judges are as capable of evaluating CBAs as they are of
evaluating any other decision or action that comes before them. In Part II
15

See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 90-92 (2016) (criticizing the
quality of current CBAs and their failure to fully account for benefits and costs).
16
See infra Part II.A.
17
MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006).
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we discuss Corrosion-Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable. We argue
that the agencies performed CBA badly and the courts properly struck down
the regulations. Part III turns to the law. We argue that that there is a strong
legal trajectory in favor of CBA, reflected in judicial decisions, executive
orders, and even the regulators’ independent judgments. This trajectory is
bipartisan or even nonpartisan, a long overdue form of bureaucratic
rationalization that addresses the question of what agencies should attempt
to accomplish when they regulate. The answer that has emerged over
decades of debate and reform is: produce benefits that exceed costs.
While many scholars have claimed that CBA is ideologically biased
toward anti-regulatory outcomes, we show that this claim is mistaken. This
point is of particular importance at the current time as we move from a
presidential administration that was friendly to regulation to one that has
committed itself to deregulation. In order to deregulate, agencies must
formally issue new regulations that eliminate or relax earlier regulations. If
they are required to conduct a CBA, then the CBA will need to show that
the benefits from deregulation exceed the costs. If the agency fails to take
this step, or if the CBA is inadequate, a reviewing court should strike down
the deregulation and leave the existing regulation in place. CBA is not a
one-way ticket to the night watchman state.
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A.

A Primer on CBA

CBA is a decision-procedure whose normative basis is what
Matthew Adler and one of us has called weak welfarism. 18 Welfarism is the
principle that the well-being of people is morally important. The word
“weak” in “weak welfarism” acknowledges that other considerations, such
as deontological principles, also may have moral importance. But while
agencies might take account of those principles when deciding whether to
regulate, they are not accounted for in a CBA. Thus, CBA does not commit
an agency to utilitarianism or other strong welfarist philosophy, but,
because it does not address deontological constraints, its scope will be
determined by the type of behavior that the government regulates. 19

18

Id. The other one of us subscribes to this normative foundation for CBA as well. See
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis v.
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013).
19
We will not discuss here whether agencies should take account of moral considerations
other than those embodied in the CBA. Our view is that agencies should very rarely do so,
but in some circumstances it may be appropriate.
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Not everyone believes that the government should advance social
welfare. 20 But most people do, and this premise is unquestioned in debates
about how regulatory agencies should behave. 21 The trickier question is
how to define and measure welfare. Most economists believe that welfare
increases whenever people are better able to satisfy their preferences, as
measured by willingness-to-pay. Most philosophers reject this view, as do
we. People’s preferences, especially when ill-informed or distorted by
social influences, do not necessarily reflect their welfare; and the reliance
on the money metric introduces further distortions because of the
diminishing marginal utility of money. 22 However, CBA, based on
willingness-to-pay, will typically approximate welfare for a range of
plausible definitions, to a greater degree than competing approaches such as
feasibility analysis. 23 This is the justification for using CBA as a decision
procedure. The analogy to net present value is useful here: no one thinks
that a NPV calculation settles the question whether a commercial project is
wise. A decision procedure like CBA and NPV formalizes the process of
decision-making so as to maximize the probability that a correct decision
will be made. It does so by helping agents remember to consider all relevant
factors, and, by requiring a common metric, facilitating comparison of those
factors.
Regulatory statutes direct agencies to advance the public good in
their area of expertise—the environment, health and safety, financial
regulation, and so on. While statutes usually do not explicitly direct
regulators to use CBA, they almost always direct regulators to consider the
costs as well as the benefits of a regulation, as we describe in more detail
below. Because CBA is the most natural way to consider costs and benefits,
the White House has directed regulators to use CBA. 24
Many commentators have criticized CBA. The criticisms in the law
and policy literature reach back to the 1980s. 25 The criticisms in the welfare
economics literature reach back even farther. 26 None of these criticisms has
carried the day. CBA is more entrenched in government than ever.
We will not rehearse all the criticisms and responses here. We
discuss just two of the criticisms pertinent to the current discussion. The
first criticism is that for many, possibly most regulations, the costs and

20

See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA (1974).
See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis & Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 7-9.
22
For a discussion, see ADLER & POSNER, supra note 14.
23
Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 11, at 672-73.
24
See Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 13563 (2012).
25
See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, for a discussion.
26
Id.
21
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(especially) benefits are largely guesswork. 27 Quantification is arbitrary and
adds nothing to the decision-making process. The SEC’s proxy access rule,
for example, might reduce the cost of capital by subjecting corporate
management to outside discipline, or it might not affect the cost of capital at
all—because the dissident nominee will nearly always lose the election, or
corporate managers will formulate new ways to minimize the influence of
shareholders. 28 The benefits are unknowable. In the case of the asbestos
rule, we do not know whether the reduction in the availability of asbestos
products will save lives or be offset by the use of more dangerous substitute
materials. 29 Regulators should not be required to quantify benefits when the
benefits are unknowable; this is an arbitrary exercise.
Our view is that if regulators cannot determine whether a regulation
will generate net benefits, then they should usually not issue the regulation.
But there may be close cases where the regulator, based on hard-toarticulate staff expertise, 30 reasonably believes that the benefits are positive
but cannot settle on a precise estimate because of the absence of hard data
and of the high cost of obtaining additional evidence through surveys and
other methods. In that case, the regulator should go ahead and regulate but
also be required to publish an estimate so that its claim to tacit expertise can
be evaluated retrospectively, along with an explanation as to why an
estimate cannot be derived from empirical evidence. 31 The D.C. Circuit
took just this view, complaining that the SEC “failed adequately to quantify
the [sic] certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be
quantified,” 32 implying that the regulation might have passed muster if the
27

See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005); see also John C. Coates, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882
(2015), who advocates “nonquantified” CBA. We think it is best to avoid confusion by not
referring to Coates’ approach as a style of CBA, which in its essence requires
quantification. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 8, called this approach “intuitive balancing.”
28
See infra Part II.B.
29
See infra Part II.A.
30
See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1355, 1396 (2016).
31
See Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15 (arguing that agencies should
be required to estimate costs and benefits and justify those estimates). We find ourselves in
agreement with the otherwise critical account of Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 30, at
1401, who argue that agencies cannot credibly appeal to tacit knowledge to rationalize bad
regulations in the long term: “the pretext problem is self-limiting, because agencies that
constantly base their decisions on (putatively) nontransmissible tacit expertise will
encounter increasing skepticism from reviewing courts over time.” However, this argument
does not support their thesis: if judges were required to approve regulations based on nonquantitative balancing of benefits and costs, as they argue, then agencies would never need
to appeal to tacit knowledge in the first place.
32
Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.
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SEC could make the case that quantification was impossible or
inappropriate. In our view, once the regulator goes on record with its
estimate of hard-to-quantify benefits, and adds them to the empirically
verified benefits and costs, the regulator may issue the regulation if the
aggregate benefits, including the estimates in question, exceed the costs.
The second criticism is that CBA is a politically biased decision
procedure—and biased in favor of ideologically conservative outcomes. 33
This view is partly based on CBA’s association with the Reagan
administration. Ronald Reagan campaigned for office promising
deregulation, and one of his first acts was to sign an executive order that
requires regulators to conduct CBA. Pro-regulation forces argued that the
CBA requirement was intended as a bureaucratic hurdle that would delay or
block needed regulations. 34 But CBA is foremost a tool of good government
and falls into a long tradition of using quantitative methods to persuade the
government and public to accept progressive change. 35 The rejection of
quantitative methods—and of science and statistics—is more closely
associated with the right (as well as the extreme left), as a matter of history.
Whatever the intentions of Reagan administration officials, the effect of the
CBA requirement, if conscientiously carried through, need not be any more
ideological than a requirement that the government budget office follow the
rules of accounting.
One version of the criticism is that because CBA discounts
unquantified (or unquantifiable) benefits, it must lead to under-regulation,
which is an outcome favored by conservatives. 36 This view seriously
misunderstands CBA. One source of error is the tendency to confuse the
33

This argument has been made for decades, but for a recent version, see Gregory C.
Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town? (2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880697. Keating claims
that cost-benefit analysis is conservative because CBA is welfarist and conservatives are
welfarist, while liberals are deontologists who reject welfarism. There are many problems
with this view, but to take just one example: welfarists going back to Bentham usually
endorse radical redistribution of wealth because of the declining utility of the dollar.
Deontologists sometimes do, but many—such as philosophical libertarians like Nozick—
do not.
34
The major exceptions are STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) and
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE (2002).
35
See William Davies, How Statistics Lost Their Power – and Why We Should Fear What
Comes
Next,
The
Guardian
(January
19,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/19/crisis-of-statistics-big-data-democracy;
RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008).
36
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27; David M. Driesen, Douglas A. Kysar &
Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 Reg. &
Governance 48 (2009).
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“market” and the status quo. If the status quo is an unregulated market, and
regulation must pass a CBA, then the CBA requirement might slow down
regulation relative to a procedure that allows regulators to disregard
evidence that does not support regulation. But the status quo almost always
involves a regulated market; CBA can slow down deregulation (which is
actually a form of regulation that strips away restrictions on market
behavior) as well as regulation because CBA requires deregulation to be
based on quantified evidence as well. Moreover, if the argument were taken
seriously, it would suggest that any type of government decision-making
that rested on analysis and evidence is inherently conservative in an
ideological sense. Such an argument would sweep in procedural
requirements such as those in the APA, and indeed the normal rules for
legislation of all kinds.
Another source of error is the view that real but difficult-to-quantify
benefits are benefits that liberals value more than conservatives, as a result
of which CBA is biased toward conservative outcomes. For example, liberal
critics of CBA have complained that CBA disregards many of the hard-tovalue benefits of environmental regulation. 37 When a regulator performs a
CBA of an environmental regulation, it can easily gather data about costs
from industry, while it can only with difficulty place valuations on the
health and recreation benefits of a cleaner environment. If regulators must
comply with CBA, then they will produce environmental regulations that
are weaker than optimal, according to these critics.
There are serious problems with this argument. First, the premise of
the argument—that measurement problems tend to result in weak regulation
because benefits are harder to measure than costs—is incorrect.
Retrospective reviews of regulations show that CBA typically undercounts
both costs and benefits in roughly equal measure. 38 Even if it is more
difficult for regulators to quantify benefits than costs, the remedy is for
regulators to invest additional resources in quantifying benefits. If
regulators have undercounted benefits in the past, that is a failing of those
regulators, not a general problem with CBA. If a regulator cannot quantify a
particular benefit or cost with precision, the regulator should offer its best
estimate. 39

37
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27 (arguing that CBA does not account well for
non-market goods such as health or environmental harms); Driesen et al., supra note 36
(same).
38
See, e.g., United States Government Accountability Office, Reexamining Regulations:
Opportunities Exist to Improve Effectiveness and Transparency of Retrospective Reviews
(2007) (surveying and summarizing approximately 1300 retrospective reviews conducted
by multiple agencies).
39
Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15, at 832.
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In addition, the mandate to avoid doubtful valuations is just a
standard of proof: it applies with equal force to the claims made by proregulation and anti-regulation forces. Business interests, for example, often
complain that regulations generate economic uncertainty that interferes with
planning and thus increases costs. In recent years, they have made this
argument about regulations issued under the Affordable Care Act and the
Dodd-Frank Act. 40 The argument is not crazy; maybe it is even true. And if
it is true, then a CBA of a regulation should take account of the uncertainty
costs that it creates in addition to the costs of compliance. But regulators
have refused to take account of uncertainty costs of this sort, no doubt
because the evidence of such costs remains slim. 41
Another mistake is the assumption that regulation always advances
the interests of liberals. Consider President Trump’s plan to build a wall
along the Mexican border in order to block illegal entry into the United
States. Trump’s major argument is that the wall would reduce crime and
terrorism. However, the evidence that the wall would have any effect on
crime or terrorism is nil. If the Department of Homeland Security were
required to perform a CBA before building the wall, 42 it would be required
to concede that the evidence indicates that illegal immigrants commit
crimes at about the same rate as U.S. citizens, which is very little. Because
the wall itself would cost billions of dollars while generating trivial benefits
in terms of crime reduction, it would fail a CBA. We suspect that similar
types of analysis would indicate that many harsh forms of law enforcement
are not cost-justified. 43
As a final example, consider the case of capital regulations, which
limit the amount of debt that banks can use to fund their investments and
loans. 44 Nearly everyone agrees that capital regulations make sense; the
ideological divide concerns how high they should be. When capital
regulations were very low, CBA would have required that they be
increased—a “liberal” outcome. Now that they are much higher, it is
40

Carter Wood, Dodd-Frank, Whence Uncertainty Springs, THE BRT BLOG (2012),
http://businessroundtable.org/media/blog/dodd-frank-whence-uncertainty-springs.
41
Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, & Steven J. Davis, Measuring Economic Policy
Uncertainty, 131 Q. J. ECON. 1593 (2016); Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, & Steven J.
Davis, Has Economic Policy Uncertainty Hampered the Economy? (Becker Friedman
Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2012-003, February 2012).
42
As it would likely be required to do if Trump relied on the Secure Fence Act of 2006
rather than a new statute, as suggested by news reports. See Daniel Hemel, Jonathan
Masur, & Eric Posner, How Antonin Scalia’s Ghost Could Block Donald Trump’s Wall,
NY TIMES, Jan. 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/how-antoninscalias-ghost-could-block-donald-trumps-wall.html?_r=0.
43
Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323 (2004).
44
See Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy
Requirements?, 82 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1853 (2015).
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possible that CBA could require that they be reduced—a “conservative”
outcome. The apparent ideological valence of CBA is an illusion generated
by the location of the status quo regulation in ideological space; CBA does
not itself have an inherent ideological valence.
B. Are Judges Capable of Evaluating CBAs?
It is possible to hold the view that regulators should conduct CBAs
but that when judges review regulations, they should not evaluate the
regulation on the basis of the quality of the CBA. It would be left for the
White House or Congress to discipline regulators who issue regulations that
fail CBAs. The argument is based on traditional notions of judicial review:
judges, as generalists, are in a weak position to evaluate the work of
experts. 45 We see this argument in many different contexts: for example, the
business judgment rule and notions that judges should defer to legislative
fact-finding or executive-branch judgments in the field of foreign relations.
While we sympathize with this view, 46 the argument overlooks the
ways that CBA facilitates judicial review. Judicial review of CBA can be
divided into two components, one procedural and the other substantive. In
reviewing procedure, the court verifies that the regulator has quantified all
the costs and benefits of the regulation and translated them into comparable
units (dollars), and that the quantified benefits exceed the quantified costs.
If the regulator fails to quantify any benefits, then the regulation cannot be
approved on the basis of those alleged benefits, though it may be approved
if the quantified benefits exceed the quantified costs. Judicial review is an
accounting procedure that any judge can undertake. It is no harder than
verifying that the deadlines for notice-and-comment rulemaking have been
obeyed.
The SEC in Business Roundtable and the EPA in Corrosion Proof
Fittings both failed to comply with the procedural elements of CBA: they
both failed to report estimates of the monetary benefits and the overall costbenefit comparison. Many other regulators routinely fail to quantify costs
and benefits in the full and rigorous way that is required by CBA. 47 Even if
courts were to enforce only the procedural requirements of CBA, they
would improve the performance of agencies.
45

Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 30; see also Sunstein, supra note 11, at 8-10, 17
(suggesting that courts should play a minimal role in reviewing cost-benefit analysis, rather
than zero role).
46
One of us once (tentatively) held this view. See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, CostBenefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM
246, 247 (2015) (mea culpa).
47
Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15.
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But enforcement of CBA procedure may not be sufficient.
Regulators may be tempted to comply formally with the rules but invent
valuations or put insufficient effort into calculating valuations. To review
valuations on substantive grounds, courts will need to second-guess
judgments that lie at the heart of the agencies’ expertise. But while
substantive review may often be challenging, it need not be. Regulators
often make easily identifiable substantive errors, including: using
inconsistent numbers for the same cost or benefit; 48 failing to consider the
tradeoffs that regulation would require, including the cost of substitutes, as
the EPA did in banning asbestos; 49 failing to discount over time or
discounting inconsistently (for example, discounting costs but not
benefits); 50 and failing to cite or discuss relevant peer-reviewed studies. 51 If
courts did no more than demand that agencies comply with these basic
forms of good practice, CBAs would be considerably better than they have
been. 52
But there are also harder cases. What should courts do when the
regulator cites conflicting studies and concludes that one study is more
plausible than the other, as in the case of the proxy access rule? 53 We think
that regulators should not regulate when the empirical evidence for
regulation is thin, but can imagine situations where courts should defer to
the regulator’s judgment on the quality of academic studies because of the
complexity of the issues involved. As is so frequently the case in litigation,
the right answer will depend on the circumstances. But courts deal with
expert studies in private litigation all the time. 54 Because both sides
typically submit expert reports with different conclusions, the court must
evaluate both of them, even though the reports may involve statistical,
48

See EPA, Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in
Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,461-62 (1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt.
763).
49
See id.
50
See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218 (discussing EPA inconsistencies in
discounting).
51
See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-FuelFired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small IndustrialCommercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16,
2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63). (EPA Mercury Rule).
52
See Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15. Sunstein offers a more
limited list of errors that should lead a court to overturn a regulation, nearly all of which
involve errors more egregious than the ones we describe above. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 10, at 17.
53
See infra Part II.B.
54
Kelli M. Hinson et al., Civil Evidence, 59 SMU L. Rev. 965, 965 (2006) (“This survey
period found the courts reviewing expert cases more than any other topic.”).
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scientific, and other technical reasoning. It cannot “defer” to two
inconsistent reports. In the case of judicial review of agency regulation,
courts should draw on the same skills that they use in private litigation.
In a recent paper, Gersen and Vermeule criticize strict judicial
review of agency action. Although their major point is that “rationality
review” does not imply searching inquiry of agency rulemaking, many of
their criticisms apply to judicial review of CBA as well, as they note. 55
Among other things, they point out that regulators often legitimately rely on
“tacit knowledge” that they cannot document for the benefit of courts; 56 that
regulators must make tradeoffs between speed and accuracy that cannot be
quantified; 57 that they face subtle questions about how to value risk; 58 and,
most of all, that regulators must make decisions in the face of extreme
uncertainty where the risks cannot be reliably quantified. 59
While all these problems create challenges for regulators and courts,
they are not insurmountable. The tacit knowledge problem is just a
restatement of the problem of valuation: often valuations are difficult to
determine. As we have argued, that problem is best addressed
institutionally, with a requirement that agencies go on record with estimates
and then evaluate the accuracy of those estimates at a future time. 60 We
agree that agencies that face deadlines or have good reason to act quickly
may need to be excused from a CBA requirement. There is a subtle question
as to how much time an agency should spend gathering information before
it conducts a CBA, one that can be answered only with common sense and
in light of experience, and here again judicial review should be deferential.
But this is more a problem of theory than of practice. We doubt that CEOs
are flummoxed when subordinates turn over sloppy NPVs and plead the
pressure of time.
Risks can usually be quantified and valued. Where they cannot be,
the problem is not for judicial review but for regulation itself. When
uncertainty makes it impossible to know whether a regulation will improve
welfare, the agency should not regulate. As we have argued elsewhere,
when regulators believe that they have strong reasons to value regulatory
benefits but lack statistical evidence that permits for a valuation, they
should make estimates and provide for retrospective review at a future date,
when the uncertainty has been resolved. 61
55

Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 1370-71.
Id. at 1396.
57
Id. at 1394-95.
58
Id. at 1387-88.
59
Id. at 1359.
60
Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15, at 132.
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Most such examples are straightforward: for example, a pollutant is known to produce
headaches in the exposed population but the regulator does not how to value a headache.
56
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The ability of courts to review the substantive determinations of
agencies is in the end an empirical question. Little can be said now about
this question because courts have so rarely reviewed the CBAs of agencies.
That has not stopped critics of CBA from pointing to Corrosion Proof
Fittings and Business Roundtable as evidence that courts are incapable of
reviewing the substance of CBAs. In the next Part, we evaluate their
argument.
II. REGULATION AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THE COURTS
If there is an “anti-canon” in administrative law, 62 it includes
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA and Business Roundtable v. SEC. Those
cases are regularly held up as examples of judicial review run amok—of
courts substituting their (less informed) judgments for those of the expert
agencies they were reviewing, with disastrous consequences. According to
this line of thinking, forcing agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses, and
allowing courts to review those cost-benefit analyses and reject them if they
are inadequate, is sure to lead to rampant invalidations of regulations that
should be allowed to stand. The academic consensus against Corrosion
Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable is nearly complete.
But the critics do not come to grips with a significant fact about the
cases: the cost-benefit analyses that supported the EPA and SEC regulations
at issue in those two cases were defective. The agencies failed to quantify
important costs and benefits, and where they did, their analyses suggested
that at least parts of the regulations were producing more costs than
benefits. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit in Corrosion Proof Fittings and the
D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable proved themselves capable of
evaluating the agencies’ CBAs and pinpointing their errors. The judicial
opinions are not perfect, but the agencies’ work was far from perfect as
well, as the courts aptly demonstrated. The two cases are examples of
cogent judicial reasoning in the face of agency error.

There are standard methods for making reasonable estimates in such circumstances. In
other cases, the exposed population is not known, and without an expensive
epidemiological studies can only be guessed at. In both cases, the agency should be
allowed to make estimates subject to a subsequent review. See id.
62
Cf. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
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A. Corrosion Proof Fittings
1. The Regulation, the Court Decision, and the Academic Response
In 1989, the EPA promulgated a rule under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) that banned the manufacture, importation, and sale of
nearly every product containing asbestos—twenty-seven products in all. 63
TSCA gives the EPA the authority to regulate any chemical substance that
presents an “unreasonable risk” to health or the environment, and it directed
the agency to select the “least burdensome requirements” that would
alleviate the risk. 64 By the time the EPA set out to regulate asbestos, it had
accumulated evidence to indicate that it was a “highly potent carcinogen”
and could cause other diseases as well, including mesothelioma (sometimes
referred to as “black lung disease”). 65 The EPA imposed a near-complete
ban on asbestos, believing that there were no acceptably safe uses, rather
than banning its use in particular products, imposing labeling requirements,
or opting for some other less stringent regulatory response.
Two years later, in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 66 the Fifth
Circuit struck down the EPA’s asbestos regulation. It held that the agency
had failed to demonstrate that this was the least burdensome means of
regulating the health hazards posed by asbestos. The court performed a
detailed examination of the EPA’s CBA and concluded that the agency had
made numerous errors in selecting its level of regulation. These included
banning products when costs were likely to exceed benefits and failing to
account for risk-risk tradeoffs. Rather than reconsider and re-promulgate the
regulation after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the EPA largely abandoned its
attempts to regulate asbestos under TSCA and relied instead on a
constellation of other statutes (and other agencies).
The scholarly response to the Fifth Circuit opinion was scathing and
uniformly negative, and it has remained so in the 25 years since the case
was decided. Shortly after it was handed down, one commentator described
Corrosion-Proof Fittings as a “tragedy;” 67 nearly twenty years later it was
still being characterized as a “bête noire” of environmentalists. 68 In
between, academic commentary regarding the decision has remained
63

EPA, Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce
Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,461-62 (1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 763).
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15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2016).
65
EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,467.
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947 F.2d 1201 (1991).
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Linda Stadler, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA: Asbestos in the Fifth Circuit--A Battle of
Unreasonableness, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 433 (1993).
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Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355,
1380 (2009) (referring to Corrosion-Proof Fittings as a “bete noire” of environmentalists).
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negative, even from scholars who otherwise tend to support CBA. 69 Most of
the criticism has centered around the argument that the court substituted its
own views regarding environmental regulation for the (more expert) EPA’s
in contravention of the proper role of courts in administrative review. 70
Scholars have been wrong to treat Corrosion Proof Fittings as an
administrative law bugbear. The Corrosion Proof Fittings court wasn’t
perfect, but it got more right than it got wrong, and it exposed serious flaws
in the EPA’s CBA. Corrosion Proof Fittings should be celebrated as a high
water mark of judicial rationality, not treated as an administrative law
pariah, as we will demonstrate.
2. The EPA’s Cost-Benefit Analysis
The EPA’s cost-benefit was based upon a comparison between two
states of the world: one in which the agency took no action to regulate
asbestos, and one in which it regulated by banning a wide range of different
products. For each of the twenty-seven products to be regulated, the EPA
calculated the reduction in fatal cases of cancer among workers who would
otherwise have come into contact with products made from asbestos. 71 On
69

Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 363 n.
272 (1999); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); David M. Driesen, Regulatory Reform: The New
Lochnerism?, 36 ENVTL. L. 603 (2006); Robert B. Haemer, Reform of the Toxic Substances
Control Act: Achieving Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 99
(1999); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997). But see Eric A. Posner, Controlling
Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1137, 1195-96 (2001) (enumerating the many problems with the EPA’s cost-benefit
analysis).
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McGarrity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking, supra note 69, at 546; see
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opinion).
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EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,486. Among the many grounds on which the Fifth Circuit
criticized the EPA was the fact that it only only calculated costs and benefits through the
year 2000. Id. In addition, the fact that the EPA only evaluated the mortality risks of
asbestos means that the agency left unquantified a variety of other regulatory benefits,
including non-fatal diseases caused by asbestos (emphysema, bronchitis, or even non-fatal
cancers), reduced medical costs, reduced asbestos exposure in the general population (as
opposed to employees who worked with asbestos), and cancer cases that might occur after
the year 2000. This continues a trend we have observed of agencies quantifying only
mortality-related benefits and not morbidity-related ones. Masur & Posner, Against
Feasibility Analysis, supra note. Extending the analysis to capture these overlooked costs
and benefits would have ambiguous effects; we do not know whether the CBA would have
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the cost side of the ledger, the agency quantified the costs to consumers of
purchasing more expensive asbestos-free products and the costs to
manufacturers (lost profits). 72
The EPA’s first misstep was its failure to consider any less stringent
alternatives to a complete asbestos ban, such as permitting the use of
asbestos so long as it was labeled with appropriate warnings, 73 or permitting
its use but requiring protective equipment, such as respirators, for anyone
working with the substance. 74 The agency did not conduct a CBA of any of
these alternatives, and from the regulation it does not appear that it even
considered them in any systematic way. 75
This oversight was significant for two reasons. First, the statute
explicitly directs the agency to select the “least burdensome” type of
regulation that would ameliorate the risks from asbestos. Without having
examined the regulatory alternatives, the agency cannot establish that it has
done so. This is the primary basis on which the court rejected the regulation,
and it might have determined the outcome even had the agency made no
other errors. 76 Many commentators have criticized the Fifth Circuit for this
aspect of its decision and argued that the statute does not in fact require the
agency to choose the least burdensome mode of regulation, the plain
language of the statute notwithstanding. 77 We agree that it is asking a lot of
an agency—too much, in all likelihood—to require it to select the optimal
regulation, as opposed to choosing the best regulation from among a finite
set of options or simply settling on a regulation that produces more benefits
than costs. The problem here was that the EPA did not consider a single
alternative in its CBA. It is difficult to see how the agency fulfilled its
statutory mandate without considering even one alternative mode of
regulation.
Second, the EPA’s decision to ignore alternatives such as requiring
workers to use protective equipment affected the CBA’s “zero regulation”
baseline. In calculating the costs and benefits of regulating, the agency
assumed that, in the absence of regulation, workers who came into contact
with asbestos would not use available protective equipment. This had the
72

EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,468. It also did not quantify the costs of lost jobs for workers
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effect of maximizing the apparent benefits of complete regulation, as
compared with the baseline of zero regulation and zero workplace safety
protections. 78
And yet despite the EPA’s having stacked the deck in its favor, the
costs of banning many asbestos-related products well outweighed their
benefits, even by the EPA’s own calculations. For instance, the EPA
estimated that it would cost $128.03 million to eliminate asbestos pipe, but
doing so would only save 4.38 lives, for a cost of $29.23 million per life
saved. 79 The EPA does not use or report a value of a statistical life (VSL)
anywhere within the regulation. The Fifth Circuit did not focus on this
oversight, but it is unquestionably an error—how can the agency know
whether the benefits of the regulation exceed the costs without converting
the two quantities into the same unit? Regardless, the $29.23 million figure
is far greater than any value that the EPA has ever used. In 1984, five years
before the asbestos regulation, the EPA used a VSL of $4.5 million; 80 in
1997, it used a value of $5.75 million; 81 and the current EPA VSL is $7.4
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EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,474. The Fifth Circuit declared that the agency had thus
“artificially inflated” the benefits of the regulation. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at
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million.82 If the EPA had used a VSL of $5.75 million, it would have found
that the ban on asbestos pipe produced benefits of only $25.19 million, and
thus costs that were more than $100 million greater than the benefits.
Similarly, the EPA estimated that its ban on asbestos shingles would
save 0.32 lives at a cost of $23.57 million, or $73.66 million per life. 83 At a
VSL of $5.75 million, this product ban would produce costs that exceed
benefits by more than $20 million. The EPA also estimated that its ban on
asbestos coatings (for roofs and other surfaces) would save 3.33 lives at a
cost of $46.29 million, or $13.3 million per life. 84 With the VSL set at $5.75
million, this part of the regulation was expected to produce costs that
exceeded benefits by roughly $27 million. It is difficult to imagine the
modern EPA, which incorporates VSL figures into its cost-benefit analyses,
making such mistakes. 85
The Fifth Circuit, drawing upon case law from the D.C. Circuit and
the Supreme Court, held that the statute’s requirement that a risk be
“unreasonable” explicitly called for cost-benefit balancing: a risk was only
“unreasonable” and thus subject to regulation if the benefits of eliminating
that risk exceeded its costs. 86 The court thus concluded that the EPA had
acted outside of its statutory authority by regulating products that did not
pose unreasonable harms.
Academic commentators who are otherwise hostile to CBA have
criticized the court on this point, arguing that it improperly substituted its
judgment for the agency’s. As a matter of policy, that criticism is
misplaced—the Fifth Circuit was right to reject the parts of the regulation
that did not pass a cost-benefit test. As a matter of law, it is certainly
possible to quarrel with the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of “unreasonable”
even though that word is often understood in other legal contexts, such as
tort law, to require balancing the benefits and costs of precautions. But this
is unimportant to our ultimate point, which is the court’s evaluation of the
EPA’s CBA. The Fifth Circuit may have been tougher on the EPA than the
statute required, but it hardly lacked the capacity to check the agency’s
work.
The EPA’s final mistake was its failure to account for the fact that
substitute non-asbestos products might carry their own risks to health and
82
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safety. If substitutes for asbestos will also lead to loss of life, those lives
should be offset from the benefits (in lives saved) of the asbestos ban. Yet
the EPA failed to perform this necessary step for several products where the
substitutes presented non-trivial risks to life. For instance, the EPA had
“credible evidence ‘that a ban on asbestos use in the aftermarket for brake
systems designed for asbestos friction products will compromise the
performance of braking systems designed for asbestos brakes’” yet failed to
account for the possible additional lives lost if brakes failed. 87 Similarly, the
EPA acknowledged that PVC pipe, the most widely used substitute for
asbestos pipe, also caused cancer among the workers who manufactured it,
perhaps even to the same extent as asbestos pipe. 88 Nonetheless, it
maintained (against evidence) that this cancer threat was likely overstated
and did not factor it into the CBA. 89 Here, again, critics have faulted the
Fifth Circuit for its “overly” searching review. But even on the EPA’s own
terms, it makes no sense to replace one unreasonable risk with another. The
agency was wrong to regulate without evaluating the full effects of its
regulation, not merely the benefits of eliminating one type of product in
isolation.
To be sure, many of the asbestos product bans would likely have
produced benefits in excess of costs—though it is difficult to be certain
without a full evaluation of the benefits and costs of substitutes. For
instance, the agency found that the ban on asbestos brakes for new
automobiles would save 19.68 lives at a cost of $12.97 million, or roughly
$660,000 per life saved. 90 On the whole, the EPA calculated that its
regulation would save 202 lives at a cost of $458.89 million, or $2.27
million per life saved. 91 Nevertheless, the fact that some of the product bans
were reasonable did not and should not insulate the others from review,
particularly given that it was fully within the EPA’s control to decide which
products to regulate. The agency originally considered regulating 37
possible products and eventually selected 27 of them. 92 It should have
selected fewer.
87
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3. Lessons
Corrosion Proof Fittings does not support the argument of its critics
that generalist courts lack the capacity to review the work of technocratic
agencies. On most technical points, the court got it right and the agency got
it wrong. The court did not second-guess the agency’s economic models or
the peer-reviewed research it relied upon, nor should it have. It relied
instead upon simple logic and even simpler arithmetic, which are hardly
foreign to even the most generalist judges. No specialized training in
science or economics was required.
If the Fifth Circuit went too far, it was in demanding formal CBA
where the law (as best understood in 1990) did not obviously require it. In
this respect, the Fifth Circuit might have been prescient, as we will explain
in Part III. But even if the court was not, these were errors of law, not errors
in evaluating the agency’s CBA. In a similar vein, some commentators have
criticized the Fifth Circuit’s choice of remedy, arguing (for instance) that
the court should have remanded the regulation to the EPA but let it remain
in force in the interim, rather than vacating it. 93 The court did not have the
authority to strike down some aspects of the regulation while letting others
stand, as courts sometimes do with statutes. Here, it was all or nothing.
Perhaps the court would have been better advised to allow the regulation to
stand while the EPA improved it on remand. But the choice of remedy
again has nothing to do with the court’s competence to review the EPA’s
CBA, which is the issue that concerns us. On that score, the Fifth Circuit’s
much-maligned opinion in Corrosion Proof Fittings is grounds for
confidence.
B. Business Roundtable
1. The Regulation, the Court Decision, and the Academic Response
Corporate voting takes place at shareholder meetings, but because
few shareholders attend the meetings, they are allowed to vote “by proxy.”
The corporation sends a proxy ballot to the mailing addresses of all
shareholders. Shareholders who wish to vote fill out the ballot and mail it
back to the corporation. (Proxy voting can also occur via the internet.) Their
votes are then registered during the shareholder meeting. Because the
corporation designs the proxy ballot (subject to various legal constraints,
including disclosure requirements), the corporation can decide whose names
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are placed on the ballot for director positions. Corporations typically
include only the names of incumbents or replacements who are endorsed by
the incumbents. When the SEC began considering the proxy access rule,
corporations were not required to include the names of “dissidents”
nominated by shareholders, and rarely did. In order to elect dissidents,
shareholders who supported them were required to prepare their own proxy
ballots and mail them directly to shareholders. This was an expensive and
time-consuming process that only the largest and most sophisticated
shareholders could afford. Critics of the system argued that that
corporations should be required to give “proxy access” to shareholders, or
some of them, so that dissident would be placed on the proxy ballot mailed
by the corporation to shareholders. 94
The SEC undertook notice-and comment rulemaking and ultimately
issued Rule 14a-11, in 2010. 95 The rule was intended to improve corporate
governance, and hence the value of the corporate form, by reducing the cost
of electing “dissident” directors who were not supported by the leaders of a
corporation. The final rule provided that a corporation must include
information about a shareholder nominee in the proxy materials and put the
nominee’s name on the proxy ballot if the nominee is nominated by a
shareholder or group of shareholders who have held at least 3% of the
voting power of the corporation for at least three years. If more than one
shareholder or group of shareholders is eligible, than only the person or
group with the largest voting power may take advantage of the proxy access
rule. Various other limits and procedural requirements were also imposed.
The D.C. Circuit struck down Rule 14a-11 in Business
Roundtable. 96 The legal bases for its holding were the Administrative
Procedure Act, which bars “arbitrary and capricious” rulemaking, and the
Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940, which require the
SEC to take account of “efficiency, competition, and capital formation”
when issuing a new rule. The Court interpreted these provisions as requiring
the SEC to show that Rule 14a-11 passed a cost-benefit test, and held that
the SEC’s CBA was defective.
The court found numerous errors in the SEC’s CBA. First, the SEC
failed to “estimate and quantify” the costs that result when companies
oppose shareholder nominees in election contests, and failed to state in the
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alternative that these costs could not be estimated. 97 Second, the SEC relied
on “insufficient empirical data” for its conclusion that Rule 14a-11 would,
by increasing the likelihood that dissidents would sit on corporate boards,
improve the performance of corporations. The studies on which the SEC
relied provided only “mixed” support. 98 Third, the SEC discounted the costs
of the rule by improperly assuming that the board and management would
not be distracted by election contests because they were required by state
law to allow them in any event, ignoring the fact that Rule 14a-11 may
make these battles more common. 99 Fourth, the SEC disregarded the risk
that Rule 14a-11 would enable “shareholders with special interests”—
unions and pension funds—to use their voting power to achieve goals
unrelated to shareholder value, like higher wages. 100 Fifth, the SEC failed to
properly estimate the incremental effect of Rule 14a-11 on the number of
election contests and frequency of nominations relative to the status quo. 101
Finally, the SEC ignored the special circumstances of investment
companies, which are subject to independent regulatory requirements that
may reduce the benefits of shareholder nominations. 102
The academic response was swift and furious. Scholars argued that
the court disregarded the law, which had never required the SEC to show
that its regulations passed a formal CBA. 103 Many earlier judicial opinions
had deferred to the SEC on a range of issues—including its evaluation of
empirical studies. Administrative law imposes numerous procedural
requirements on agencies like the SEC—requirements that they give notice,
that they explain their decisions, and so on—and the court did not identify a
significant failure to comply with any of these requirements. Moreover,
scholars argued that the court mishandled the studies—giving weight to a
literature survey conducted by experts hired by the petitioners while
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dismissing high-quality peer-reviewed articles that lent support to the SEC’s
position. 104
2. The CBA and Its Problems
The SEC reported a CBA in the materials accompanying the
proposed rule, and then updated it in light of comments. The latter
document, which we focus on, accompanies the final rule. The CBA is
seriously deficient. It does not adequately quantify either the benefits or the
costs of the rule.
In the CBA, the SEC identifies four categories of benefit: (1)
facilitating shareholders’ ability to nominate and elect directors; (2) creating
a “minimum uniform procedure” for voting; (3) “potentially” improving
board and company performance; and (4) creating more informed voting.
However, the only benefit the SEC quantifies is the cost savings for
shareholders, who on average save $18,000 per election contest in avoided
printing and postage costs. 105
Moreover, as the SEC seems to acknowledge, the key question is not
the (de minimis) postage and printing cost savings, but the effect of the rule
on corporate performance. To evaluate this question, the SEC would need to
quantify three key variables: the rule’s effect on the probability that
shareholders will nominate dissidents; its effect on the probability that the
dissidents will be elected; and the effect of the dissident’s occupation of a
board seat on the corporation’s behavior and ultimately its profits. It
quantifies none of these variables.
For the first, the SEC argues that the proxy rule increases the
probability that dissidents will be nominated because the cost savings
encourage shareholders to nominate directors in the first place. 106 But while
simple economics suggests that if the cost of nomination declines, the
frequency of nomination will increase, the minimal cost savings mean that
the change in frequency will also be minimal. For the rule to have beneficial
effects, the dissident nominee must also be elected—and presumably that
will occur less than 100% of the time because other shareholders may prefer
to vote for management nominees.
With respect to the second, the SEC does not estimate the
probability that dissident nominees will be elected. A typical large
shareholder of a large public corporation will rarely own more than 5-7% of
the firm. The shareholder will be outvoted unless it can convince other
shareholders to join it. This probability might be small, even tiny.
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The third question is whether a corporation that includes a dissident
on its board will make higher profits than a corporation that lacks such a
dissident. An initial concern is that the dissident will always be outvoted by
the incumbents, and will otherwise not exert much influence on corporate
decisions. However, it is also possible that incumbent directors will work
harder and display greater loyalty to shareholders because they fear the
greater chance of being replaced by dissidents. The SEC cites academic
papers that it says support this position, but the two major studies it relies
on provide no real evidence in support. One study, by Cernich et al., claims
that firms with hybrid boards outperform those that do not but does not
include a statistical test of the data it relies on. 107 The other, by Mulherin
and Poulsen, is statistically rigorous but focused on a different question.
The authors show that firms that face proxy contests gain more value than a
control group of firms that do not, but their study does not test the relevant
hypothesis that lowering the cost of proxy contests increases the value of
corporations. 108 Moreover because proxy contests are most likely to occur
at the most poorly managed corporations, the positive effect they find
reflects variation in management and so does not reflect the benefits (or
costs) for firms with better management. 109 In any event, the SEC does not
estimate the effect of Rule 14a-11 on corporate performance; it merely says
that it is positive.
The SEC examines three categories of potential costs: possible
adverse effects on company performance; additional complexity; and the
costs of preparing, printing, and mailing additional proxy materials. It
acknowledges all of these possible costs but addresses only the third
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category in quantitative terms. In a confusing passage, the SEC makes
various estimates of the costs in time and money for companies (and in
some cases, shareholders) to make relevant disclosures, evaluate proposals
for their legal compliance, print and mail proxy materials, and fight against
a shareholder nominee. 110 However, in some cases it is unclear whether the
SEC agreed with commentators’ estimates, and, in any event, it does not
conclude with a formal aggregate estimate.
The SEC’s CBA was plainly inadequate. Because it did not include
estimates of (quantified) aggregate costs and benefits, it did not provide a
basis for the conclusion that the rule was efficient. The court properly struck
down the rule on cost-benefit grounds.
What should the SEC have done? The major question is whether
Rule 14a-11 would improve the value of corporations by more than the cost
of compliance. On the benefit side, proxy access will improve the value of a
corporation if, by improving corporate governance, it reduces the cost of
capital. To evaluate the prospect for such improvement, two questions must
be answered. First, how many firms—and what kind of firms—are likely to
add dissident directors as a result of the proxy access rule? Second, to what
extent will dissident directors affect the performance of a firm?
We suspect that the major obstacle to the rule is that it is implausible
that, by reducing the cost of nominating a director by $18,000, the rule
would produce more than a trivial likelihood that dissidents will be
nominated and elected over the baseline. This amount of money is pocket
change for shareholders who own 3% of a large firm. If they expect to gain
financially from the election of a dissident, this amount of money will not
show up on the radar screen. And if the increased likelihood of election of a
dissident director is trivial, then the overall effect of the rule will be trivial
as well. While the SEC cited a study that suggested that proxy contests (but
not necessarily contests involving dissident nominees) increase firm value,
it did not derive an estimate of this benefit for use as an input in the CBA of
the proxy access rule. 111 It matters to the CBA whether the improvement in
corporate performance is great or small. Finally, the academic literature
does not provide much support for the claim that large shareholders will
cause firms to maximize profits rather than serve those shareholders’
private interests. Theory suggests that the shareholder has a weak incentive
to maximize profits because most of the gains accrue to other
shareholders. 112
The best argument for the SEC is that the cost of complying with the
rule is likely small. The only clearly identifiable costs are the printing and
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mailing costs, which are very small. Indeed, they are likely to be zero or
even negative in aggregate given that the rule transfers the burden from the
shareholder to the corporation, which must merely augment the proxy
materials, unlike the shareholder who must produce a separate mailing.
A more difficult question is how to estimate the cost of proxy battles
that erupt when the corporation takes steps to fight the dissident nominee.
We think that the best approach would have been to survey corporations
and ask how much they have spent in these cases. Some commentators
claimed costs as high as $14 million. 113 While the SEC may have been
justified in disregarding these numbers—which may have been
unrepresentative or self-serving—it should have used a rigorous method to
estimate costs.
Finally, the SEC should have addressed the argument that the proxy
access rule would have been exploited by labor unions and pension plans to
push through dissident directors uninterested in maximizing corporate
profits. Here, we suspect that SEC was right to reject this argument, though
it should have explained why. If, as we suggest above, the incremental
savings of $18,000 will increase the probability of a dissident election by
only a trivial amount, and if a dissident director will normally be outvoted,
especially if it is true that he or she will try to transfer corporate resources to
a favored constituency, then the harm done would be insignificant. But this
argument implies the benefits of the rule are low as well, and so if it is
sound, the rule would probably still fail a CBA.
3. Lessons
The reason that the court in Business Roundtable acted rightly in
striking down the proxy access rule is not that the rule was obviously a bad
one but that the SEC failed to supply an adequate CBA. The SEC’s CBA
was inadequate because it did not calculate aggregate benefits and costs in
quantified form. If the court had upheld the rule, the SEC would have been
given no incentive to take CBA seriously. There is also strong evidence
that, as a result of Business Roundtable, the SEC has significantly improved
its CBAs. 114
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The case would have been a great deal more difficult if the SEC had
supplied estimates of the benefits and the costs derived from the studies that
it cited. If it had conducted the surveys that we suggest, the petitioners
would have attacked the quality of those surveys, and the court would have
been required to evaluate them. We believe that the regulator should be
given the benefit of the doubt when it interprets ambiguous survey results or
must reconcile inconsistent findings of high-quality studies performed by
academics or government researchers. It is possible, as some commentators
argue, that the D.C. Circuit signaled that the SEC would be required to
satisfy unrealistic standards, and, if so, it should be criticized. But because
the SEC omitted the relevant cost and benefit estimates, the court’s ruling
was correct, and we are left without information as to whether the court
would have approved a higher quality CBA.
C. A Broader Perspective
The critics of Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable
have much to say about law and precedent but do not come to grips with the
real driver of the cases: that the CBAs of the EPA and SEC were shoddy.
The courts were right to insist that if the EPA and SEC use CBA, then they
should use it properly. The most significant errors of the EPA were its
failure to monetize benefits, its insistence on banning products where the
costs exceeded the benefits, and its failure to consider the costs of
alternatives. In the case of the SEC, the failure to quantify the major
benefits and costs of the regulation was decisive. As a result of the cases,
both agencies have improved the quality of their CBAs. 115
What accounts for the criticism of these cases? Both judicial
opinions included some questionable reasoning. The Fifth Circuit seemed to
imply that it would keep striking down EPA regulations until the EPA
chose the single socially optimal regulation. We can see why commentators
might worry that the EPA would never be able to satisfy this standard, and
so if the Court were taken literally, regulation would become impossible or
enormously difficult. However, the commentators read too much into the
opinion. Once the Court satisfied itself that the CBA was inadequate, it was
obviously tempted—perhaps reasonably so—to identify all the problems
that it saw with the EPA’s reasoning so that the EPA would not repeat these
mistakes the next time around. The Court did not say that any one of these
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problems, taken on its own, would have been fatal to the regulation.
Moreover, whether or not the Fifth Circuit erred in demanding too much of
the agency, it demonstrated that it was capable of reviewing the EPA’s
analysis.
The D.C. Circuit also said more than it needed to in Business
Roundtable. Commentators leapt on a brief passage in which the Court
appeared to rely on a report prepared by the petitioners’ experts while
disregarding a peer-reviewed study. 116 We agree that the Court should have
given more attention to the academic study and less attention to the expert
report. That said, the study did not support the regulation, while the expert
report seems to have adequately summarized the literature. Given that the
SEC did not quantify the relevant benefits and costs, the Court’s error was
of no significance.
Commentators also argued that both courts disregarded precedents
and misinterpreted statutes. Their argument boils down to the claim that the
APA commands courts to be “deferential” and the two panels did not defer
to the judgments of the regulators. The problem with this argument is that
the APA makes no such command: it is entirely ambiguous. The Supreme
Court and the lower courts have from time to time in dicta announced that
courts should “defer” to the judgments of agencies, but this requirement has
always been empty. 117 It at most rules out the extreme end of the
spectrum—the “high” or de novo level of review. In the cases themselves,
the rulings are all over the place: sometimes courts strike down regulations
based on seemingly minor disagreements with regulators, at other times
they uphold regulations even after expressing doubts about major
determinations by the regulators. 118 We are firmly of the view that there is
no way to derive a “rule” from this riot of case outcomes. But you can’t
prove a negative. Maybe there is, and it is invisible or has not yet been
discovered.
We think that CBA offers a way out. Courts really can scrutinize
CBAs in a consistent way, just as they can scrutinize whether agencies
follow procedural requirements like notice-and-comment. While judgment
calls cannot be eliminated, they can be confined to a small portion of the
decision space. The courts in Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business
Roundtable were the first to understand this point.
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III. CBA AND THE LAW
We see Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable as
harbingers rather than errors—harbingers of an era of enhanced judicial
review of CBA. This conviction is fortified by developments in the
Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court has not gone as far as the Fifth
and D.C. Circuits, it has laid out a path in this direction.
A. CBA in the Supreme Court
The story begins inauspiciously for CBA. In the 2001 case American
Trucking v. Whitman, 119 the Supreme Court addressed national ambient air
quality standards promulgated by the EPA under Section 109 of the Clean
Air Act. 120 That statute directs the EPA to establish “ambient air quality
standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of
safety, are requisite to protect the public health.” 121 Trade groups
challenging EPA standards for ozone and particulate matter argued that the
agency should have taken costs into account when setting air quality
standards. 122 But the Court held that this part of the Clean Air Act did not
permit the EPA to use CBA when regulating. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, explained: “we find it implausible that Congress would give to the
EPA through these modest words the power to determine whether
implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards.”123
“The language,” the Court said, “is absolute.” 124
Eight years later, however, the Court took a very different approach
to CBA. Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, which governs thermal
discharge and cooling water intake, directs the EPA administrator to
promulgate regulations that “reflect the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.” 125 The EPA balanced costs
against benefits in determining the appropriate level of regulation. 126 In
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Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 127 the Court upheld the EPA regulation as a
valid exercise of agency discretion under Chevron against challengers who
argued that the agency should not have been permitted to use CBA. 128 As
the Court explained,
“[B]est technology” may also describe the technology that most
efficiently produces some good. In common parlance one could
certainly use the phrase “best technology” to refer to that which
produces a good at the lowest per-unit cost, even if it produces a
lesser quantity of that good than other available technologies. 129
While the Court did not hold that CBA was required—an issue that was not
before the Court—the holding was of great significance. Section 316(b)
instructs the EPA to minimize adverse environmental impact without regard
to costs or any other economic side constraint. Language which could have
been interpreted to ban CBA—especially after Whitman—was instead
interpreted as permissive. After Entergy, it seems that courts will not block
an agency from using CBA, except perhaps if there is an explicit statutory
prohibition. 130 Because the White House requires most agencies to use CBA
for most regulations where statutes allow them, 131 Entergy means that CBA
is more entrenched than ever.
Why did the Court undergo an about-face after Whitman? We do not
know the answer, but a possible explanation is that it has realized that CBA
is a routine rather than exceptional practice for agencies, and a good one at
that. This recognition seems to be shared by all of the ideological positions
on the court. The dissenters in Entergy said that another provision of the
Clean Water Act—Section 301(b), which requires that the EPA mandate
“the best practicable control technology” 132 and directs the agency to
consider “the total cost of application of technology in relation to the
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved” 133—required (rather than merely
permitted) the agency to use CBA despite the ambiguity of the language. 134
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In 2015, the Supreme Court took one step further. Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act, which governs regulation of certain hazardous air pollutants,
instructs the EPA to regulate airborne emissions from power plants if it
believes that regulation is “appropriate and necessary.” 135 In the course of
defending a regulation governing mercury emissions, the EPA argued that it
need not take costs into account when deciding whether the regulation was
“appropriate and necessary.” 136 The Supreme Court rejected that view,
Chevron notwithstanding. The Court held:
The Agency must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost
of compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate
and necessary. We need not and do not hold that the law
unambiguously required the Agency, when making this preliminary
estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value. 137
What does it mean to require an agency to take into account “cost”
but not to conduct a “formal” CBA? It is not clear, but there is reason to
believe that the Court thinks—or will soon think—that a formal CBA is
required as well. 138 The Court did not reach the question of whether a full
CBA was mandated only because the EPA had taken the extreme position
that it need not consider costs at all. In addition, the Court not only said that
the agency must “consider” costs, but added that “[n]o regulation is
‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good.” 139
Adrian Vermeule has suggested that the Court required only that
agencies “consider” costs (in some fashion) and stopped short of requiring
that they quantify or monetize those costs. 140 But determining whether a
regulation “does significantly more harm than good,” as the Court demands,
necessarily requires comparing the magnitudes of costs and benefits. 141 The
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only way for an agency (or court) to compare costs and benefits is to
quantify them and translate them into comparable units—in effect, to
monetize them. Thus, even though it does not say so explicitly, the Supreme
Court has for all practical purposes created a rule that agencies must
quantify and monetize costs and benefits.
Even if we are wrong and Vermeule is right, the other problem with
his argument is that agencies (other than independent agencies) are required
to conduct CBA—by the White House. And the White House normally
requires that the CBA involve both quantified benefits and quantified
costs. 142 When a challenge to a regulation reaches a court, then as a
practical matter—even if not as a legal matter if Vermeule is correct—the
Court will be in a position to review the agency’s assessment of costs and
benefits. That leaves the question whether a court will give the agency a
pass if the agency says that costs or benefits exist without quantifying them.
The logic of Michigan v. EPA suggests that the answer is no. After all, in
that case the EPA did not deny that there would be costs, only that it need
not quantify or consider them at the initial stage of regulation. This was
unacceptable to the Court.
In principle the EPA could comply with Michigan v. EPA by issuing
a regulation that, it explicitly admits, generates benefits of $1 billion and
costs of, say, $1.1 billion. But we expect that a regulator would be reluctant
to make such an admission; indeed, that such an admission could be
politically and legally fatal. It is not hard to imagine an oversight hearing
where a member of Congress screams at the agency head: “you admit the
regulation will cause more costs than benefits and you issued it anyway?”
Moreover, a judge, no matter how inclined to be deferential, could strike
down a regulation for the same reason. Agencies know this. In all of our
research, we have found only a handful of regulatory impact analyses in
which an agency admits that the costs of a regulation exceed the benefits,
and in all of those instances the agency noted that it was obligated to
promulgate the regulation by statute, regardless of cost. 143 Otherwise, when
agencies report quantified costs that exceed the benefits, the agencies
always insist that unquantified benefits justify the regulation. 144 This critical
bit of wiggle room now appears to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court as a
practical (if not legal) matter.
It is important to note that the Court in Michigan v. EPA concluded
that the EPA must balance costs and benefits in the face of highly
significantly more harm than good,” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2711, which
necessarily demands that the agency consider both benefits and harms.
142
Executive Order 12,866; Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4.
143
Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15, at 133-42.
144
Id.
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ambiguous statutory text. “Appropriate and necessary” is amenable to a
broad range of statutory meanings, and it invokes cost-benefit balancing
much less directly than many other regulatory statutes, such as the “best
practicable control technology” provision from the Clean Water Act. For
the Supreme Court to hold that a statute that nowhere mentions costs
nonetheless requires consideration of costs—and requires that costs not
significantly exceed benefits—represents a significant evolution from its
position in Whitman v. American Trucking. There are a wide variety of
regulatory statutes that use ambiguous language similar to “appropriate and
necessary.” There are also many other statutes that use language that seems
to invoke cost-benefit analysis even more directly. We survey and catalog
some of these statutes in the Appendix.
As in the case of Entergy, the Court’s enthusiasm for CBA crossed
partisan lines. On the issue at the stake in the case, the dissenters agreed that
the EPA must consider costs when regulating under § 112 of the EPA. The
dissenters departed from the majority because they believed that the agency
had in fact done so in the course of regulating. 145 Writing for the four
dissenters, Justice Kagan even took the opportunity to offer a ringing
endorsement of the importance of considering costs:
Cost is almost always a relevant—and usually, a highly important—
factor in regulation. Unless Congress provides otherwise, an agency
acts unreasonably in establishing “a standard-setting process that
ignore[s] economic considerations.” At a minimum, that is because
such a process would “threaten[ ] to impose massive costs far in
excess of any benefit.” And accounting for costs is particularly
important “in an age of limited resources available to deal with
grave environmental problems, where too much wasteful
expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean considerably
fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps
more serious) problems.” 146
Justice Kagan’s dissent suggests a default rule: agencies must weigh costs
and benefits, at least in some fashion, absent an explicit statement to the
contrary. 147 This position is not yet law; the Michigan v. EPA majority does
145
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Although we have
criticized the EPA’s approach to the regulation, see Masur & Posner, Unquantified
Benefits, supra note 15, at 131-33, we tend to agree with Justice Kagan on this point.
However, it is immaterial to our broader argument regarding the Court’s endorsement of
CBA.
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Id. at 2716-17 (internal citations omitted).
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See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 11-12
(describing Justice Kagan’s opinion in similar terms).
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not comment on it one way or the other. But the fact that even the Michigan
v. EPA dissenters—presumably the justices who are least favorably inclined
toward CBA—are willing to make such a statement is an obvious indication
of the degree to which the Court now favors CBA.
B. The Federal Common Law of the Administrative State
If we are right that CBA is becoming a generic, judicially-imposed
requirement for regulation, what is the source of law? We see three
possibilities.
The Organic Statutes. Entergy and Michigan v. EPA tie CBA (or
consideration of costs, in the latter case) to the text of the regulatory statutes
at issue. This raises the inference that if a general CBA mandate exists, as
we have argued, then it must be because Congress has ordered agencies to
use CBA in hundreds of regulatory statutes.
If such a position were taken, then a CBA mandate would be nearly
universal. Nearly all organic statutes—as far as we have been able to
survey—use language that is at least as general as that in Michigan v. EPA,
and a huge number of them use language that requires considerations of
cost, like the statute in Entergy. We provide numerous examples, with the
accompanying language, in the Appendix.
Still, any claim that Congress intended for agencies to use CBA
across the board is a fiction. Many statues, such as the “appropriate and
necessary” provision at issue in Michigan v. EPA, do not mention CBA; the
general language they use is best interpreted as exhortation to the agency
that it take seriously the risks that they are required to regulate, not that it
regulate those risks in any particular way.
The Administrative Procedure Act. Section 706 of the APA
authorizes courts to strike down regulations that are “arbitrary and
capricious.” 148 Most scholars think that this level of review is highly
deferential, based on the language itself, the practical limitations on
generalist review of expert agencies, and the case law. 149 By contrast, Cass
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Id. at 4 (“[W]henever the governing statute authorizes an agency to quantify costs and
benefits and to weigh them against each other, its failure to do so requires a non-arbitrary
justification.”).
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Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 30 (arguing that arbitrary and capricious review has
traditionally been lax).

37

Sunstein interprets this provision to require agencies to conduct CBA absent
explicit statutory language to the contrary. 150
Sunstein’s argument would make sense of a general trend in the case
law that transcends the particular statutes under which agencies regulate.
The APA applies to all agency regulation; if the APA requires CBA, then
all agencies must conduct CBA. Sunstein also thinks the cases—including
Michigan v. EPA—support his view. 151
The problem is that none of the opinions in Michigan v. EPA
mentions the APA, or even uses the words “arbitrary” or “capricious.”
Entergy similarly lacks even a single mention of the APA, or a single
appearance of the words “arbitrary” or “capricious.” Even Whitman v.
American Trucking mentions the APA only in relation to whether the
agency action in that case is final and reviewable. There is no mention of
section 706, and the words “arbitrary” or “capricious” do not appear. 152 It is
of course possible to construct a reasonable argument that it would be
arbitrary and capricious to promulgate a regulation that does not pass a costbenefit test. 153 But it is hard to see the APA as the source of the judicial
momentum behind CBA without so much as a single mention of the statute.
Sunstein places significant weight on Justice Kagan’s dissent in
Michigan v. EPA, which we described above. He observes that Justice
Kagan’s position on CBA does not appear tethered to the Clean Air Act or
any other regulatory statute—Kagan is making broad claims about the role
of CBA in administrative regulation more generally. 154 Sunstein then argues
that this background principle must derive from the APA. 155 But, like the
author of the majority opinion, Justice Kagan does not cite the APA or
150

Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 2
(“Whenever an agency fails to calculate costs and benefits and to show that the latter
justify the former, a litigant might contend that it has acted arbitrarily.”); Cass R. Sunstein
& Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 393, 440-42
(“Indeed, it would generally seem arbitrary for an agency to issue a rule that has net costs
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note 34, at 54-57.
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mention the words arbitrary and capricious. Instead, she cites prior Supreme
Court opinions, particularly Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Entergy, that
also do not cite or mention the APA. There is no textual hook that connects
these cases to the APA.
Federal Common Law. While courts like to tie their decisions to
statutes, we think a better explanation of the development of CBA is as a
kind of (federal) common law. The courts have awoken to the value of CBA
and have increasingly mandated it because they believe that CBA should
play a role in regulation. Seen in this perspective, we can reframe
Sunstein’s APA argument by interpreting the APA as a general
authorization to courts to develop a common law of the administrative state,
just as the Sherman Act is today understood as an authorization of courts to
develop a common law of antitrust. 156 The two statutes are equally
ambiguous: they all but insist that courts develop their own standards. 157
Just as the courts groped around blindly for decades before settling on
economic principles for guiding antitrust litigation, so have they finally,
after much meandering, begun to settle on CBA for regulatory review.
Why? It seems likely that courts have come to recognize that the technical
advantages of CBA make it a good practice, not much different from
keeping records, announcing deadlines, using data rather than anecdotes,
using science rather than astrology, explaining decisions, and listening to
criticism. The White House’s support for CBA over many decades and the
increasing sophistication of agencies’ CBAs have probably also played a
role. 158
Taking a wide view and relying on hindsight, one can see CBA as
the second stage of the rationalization of American government. The first
stage was the New Deal, which transferred authority from state legislatures
and common-law courts to federal agencies. The agencies were staffed with
156
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007)
(“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”).
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Adrian Vermeule has argued that courts cannot require cost-benefit analysis without a
direct statutory mandate because doing so would run afoul of Vermont Yankee. Sunstein &
Vermeule, supra note 150; Vermeule, , supra note 140. Vermont Yankee prohibits courts
from devising procedural requirements beyond those outlined in the APA. But as we have
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experts and given broad authority to regulate in the public interest. But from
an early stage the New Deal was opposed by people who feared that federal
regulators would abuse their discretion. Congress grappled with this
problem by imposing procedural requirements on agencies and providing
for an ambiguous level of judicial review in the APA. 159 By the 1970s,
however, it was clear that the system was unsustainable. Much regulation
turned out to be ill-conceived and ideologically motivated. A bipartisan
deregulatory movement corrected many of the worst errors, but by the
1980s the deregulatory movement splintered into a faction that sought to
turn the clock back to 1932 and a faction that sought technocratic
rationalization. CBA was born amid these controversies, and was initially
considered a “conservative” decision-procedure because of its association
with President Reagan. Its survival across Democratic administrations has
put that myth to rest.
The natural interpretation of this legal trajectory is that the three
branches of government are converging on the view that regulatory agencies
should normally comply with CBA. As a technical matter, the courts have
mostly relied on organic statutes rather than on the APA. At the level of
legal theory, we think it best to describe this development as one of federal
common law. But the end result is the same: cost-justified administrative
law.
CONCLUSION
Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable have long been
criticized as egregious examples of judicial overreaching into areas of
agency discretion. But the courts should be celebrated for their insight
rather than condemned for their hubris. As the Supreme Court has gradually
come to recognize, regulatory agencies should use CBA and courts are
capable of forcing them to. CBA is a decision procedure: requiring agencies
to comply with this procedure is no more difficult than forcing them to
comply with the procedural elements of the APA. And while CBA also
requires substantive judgments—estimates of valuations—that are more
difficult for courts to review, courts can nonetheless contribute to
administrative rationality by correcting valuation errors that regulatory
agencies frequently commit and demanding that agencies offer explanations
for their valuations that go beyond boilerplate. This point applies just as
159

It may also have been intended to empower judges appointed by Democratic presidents
to block deregulation by administrators appointed by Republican presidents, as argued by
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strongly to deregulation as to regulation. If a president seeks to impose new
environmental or safety regulations, he must demonstrate that they will
create greater benefits than costs. And if a president wishes to dismantle
existing regulations, no less is required.
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APPENDIX
Statutes that explicitly reference costs
Statute
Section
America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 316(b)
America Invents Act

125 Stat. 284 § 10(e)(1)(B)

Clean Air Act

42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)

Clean Air Act

42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4),
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3)

Clean Air Act

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)

Clean Water Act

33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1),
33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B)

Clean Water Act

33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(A)(i),
33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(A)(i)
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E),
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B)

Clean Water Act

160

Text
“shall consider the effect of any such
regulation on the economy”
“the specific rationale and purpose for the
proposal, including the possible
expectations or benefits resulting from the
proposed change.”
“require the maximum degree of reduction
in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants
. . . that the Administrator, taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such
emission reduction . . . determines is
achievable.”
“best available control technology” defined
as “the maximum degree of reduction . . .
which the [EPA] . . . taking into account
energy, environmental, and economic
impacts and other costs, determines is
achievable.”
“best system of emission reduction which
(taking into account the cost of achieving
such reduction . . .) the Administrator
determines has been adequately
demonstrated” 160
“best available demonstrated control
technology” . . . “tak[ing] into
consideration the cost of achieving such
effluent reduction”
“best available technology economically
achievable” while considering “the cost of
achieving such effluent reduction.”
“best conventional pollutant control
technology” considering “the
reasonableness of the relationship between
the costs of attaining a reduction in
effluents and the effluent reduction benefits
derived.”

This is the section of the statute under which the Obama Administration promulgated the Clean Power Plan,
which regulates the emission of greenhouse gases, https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/what-epa-doing, and it is
the statute under which the next administration will be attempting to repeal the Clean Power Plan by regulation.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-energy-idUSKCN0YH2D9.

Clean Water Act

33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A),
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B)

Commodity
Exchange Act

7 U.S.C. § 19(a)

Consumer Product
Safety Act

15 U.S.C §2058(f)

Dodd-Frank Act

12 U.S.C. §5512(b)(2)

Investment Advisers
Act

15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c)

Prison Rape
Elimination Act of
2003

42 U.S.C. § 15607(a)(1)(3)

Community
Development and
Regulatory
Improvement Act

12 U.S.C. §4802(a)

Statutes with ambiguous language
Statute
Section
Agricultural
7 U.S.C. § 1624(b)
Marketing Act
Clean Air Act
Clean Air Act
Clean Air Act
FAA Extension,
Safety, and Security
Act

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)
42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)
42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1)
49 U.S.C. § 106(f)(3)(A)

“best practicable control technology”
considering “the total cost of application of
technology in relation to the effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved” 161
“the Commission shall consider the costs
and benefits of the action of the
Commission”
“A description of the potential benefits and
potential costs of the rule, including costs
and benefits that cannot be quantified in
monetary terms, and the identification of
those likely to receive the benefits and bear
the costs”
“In prescribing a rule . . . the Bureau shall
consider the potential benefits and costs to
consumers and covered persons”
“the Commission shall also consider . . .
whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation”
“The Attorney General shall not establish a
national standard under this section that
would impose substantial additional costs
compared to the costs presently expended
by Federal, State, and local prison
authorities.”
“each Federal banking agency shall
consider . . . any administrative burdens
that such regulations would place on
depository institutions . . . and the benefits
of such regulations”
Text
“The Secretary of Agriculture shall
promulgate such orders, rules, and
regulations as he deems necessary”
“requisite to protect the public health” 162
“appropriate and necessary” 163
“reasonably available control technology”
“the Administrator is authorized to issue,
rescind, and revise such regulations as are
necessary”

161
This is the section of the Clean Water Act that the dissenting justices in Entergy—Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg—agreed “specified that the EPA was to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.” Entergy, 556 U.S. at 241-43
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
162
This is the statutory section at issue in Whitman v. American Trucking.
163
This is the statutory section at issue in Michigan v. EPA.
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Fair Credit
Reporting Act
Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act

15 U.S.C. §1681s

“necessary or appropriate”

21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)

Food Safety
Modernization Act

21 U.S.C § 350g(o)

Healthy, HungerFree Kids Act
International
Lending Supervision
Act
Investment Advisers
Act

42 U.S.C. § 1779(a)

“shall bear such appropriate statements of
the restrictions required . . . as the
Secretary may in such regulation prescribe”
“those risk-based, reasonably appropriate
procedures, practices, and processes . . . to
significantly minimize or prevent the
hazards identified”
“shall prescribe such regulations as the
Secretary may deem necessary”
“necessary or appropriate”

Marine Mammal
Protection Act
Occupational Safety
and Health Act

16 U.S.C. § 1373(a)

Privacy Act
Secure Fence Act
Securities Exchange
of 1934

15 U.S.C. §6801(b)
120 Stat. 2638
15 U.S.C. §78w(a)(2)

12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2)

15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c)

29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)

Telecommunications 47 U.S.C. §1302(a)
Act of 1996
Statutes that reference maximal regulation
Statute
Section
Clean Water Act
33 U.S.C. § 1326(b)
Federal Mine Health
and Safety Act

30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6)(A)

“necessary or appropriate in the public
interest [including] whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation” 164
“necessary and appropriate”
“which most adequately assure[], to the
extent feasible . . . that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health” and
are “reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment”
“shall establish appropriate standards”
“necessary and appropriate” 165
“shall not adopt any such rule or regulation
which would impose a burden on
competition not necessary or appropriate”
“in a manner consistent with the public
interest”
Text
“best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact” 166
“standards which most adequately assure
on the basis of the best available evidence
that no miner will suffer material
impairment”

164

This is the statutory section at issue in Business Roundtable.
This is the statutory section under which President Trump proposes to build a wall at the Mexican border.
Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements.
166
This is the statutory section at issue in Entergy.
165
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Surface Mining
Control and
Reclamation Act

30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(24)

“minimize disturbances and adverse
impacts” of surface mining “to the extent
possible using the best technology
currently available”
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